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Abstract— This This paper attempts to reconstruct and achieve 
learning from the mega financial crime that occurred at Dubai 
Islamic Bank (DIB) during the global crisis and juxtapose it with 
fraudulent practices from a global perspective with the aim to 
acquire a broader knowledge on fraud, especially in shariah-
based organizations. Thus, this paper could conceivably 
contribute to the rarely covered topic concerning financial crimes 
within Islamic organizations. Additionally, descriptive, 
comparative, and analytical research are exerted in this study. As 
for the findings, the scandal divulged that the significant power 
of the government exercised through mandating faith-based 
banking and acquiring major shareholding does not seem to 
prevent white-collar frauds much to the outrage of civilized 
lawmakers. This implies that just like its conventional 
counterpart, Islamic banking is not immune to fraud. In 
addition, the paper highlights that the most offensive 
misconducts found in the case are: i) the fraudulent activities 
were concealed or kept in secrecy; ii) there was a lack of 
‘shoulder to shoulder’ knowledgeable people to oversee the risk 
and warning signs; and finally iii) the modus operandi employed 
was collaborating. Accordingly, the study refreshes and stresses 
to the influential characters involved, namely, respective 
regulators and top-level officials of the organization on the 
importance of robust, prudent, and sustainable practical conduct 
for they are the accredited people whose enforcement and in-
company culture will distinguish the right from the wrong. 
Keywords- Ethic; Financial crime; Fraud; Governance; Global 
crisis  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Several academic studies have discussed financial crimes 
and frauds, juxtaposing with issues on ethics in the aftermath of 
the sub-prime mortgage crisis. It is acknowledged that at the 
time of the crisis, a majority of the financial institutions around 
the world, especially those in the banking sector, bore the 
major brunt of the effect caused by the ‘ordinarily unqualified’ 
mortgage portfolio which was turned into securitized 
instruments and offered as bluff investments. 
Islamic banking contracts, especially in high leveraged 
countries like the United Arab Emirates (UAE), place a high 
reliance on asset-backed transactions, viz. real estates and 
properties as collaterals. Although Islamic banks were not 
affected directly from the crisis, due to the prolonged duration 
of the crisis, it is undeniable that credit risk and financial gain 
suffered a decline due to the erosion in the value of collaterals 
in which a large share of financing was channeled to the real 
estate market. Dubai as the real estate hub in the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) countries took the largest hit from 
the property crash in 2008 [1]. 
Notwithstanding some triumphs made in terms of 
improvement in credit and asset growth during the mortgage 
crisis, Islamic banks (IBs) in the UAE had flaws in risk 
handling which later on led to a deterioration in the 
profitability of IBs in 2009 [2]. A study revealed that among 
the countries in the GCC, only the UAE had the experience 
whereby the IBs performed worse than the conventional banks 
(CBs) during the financial crisis period in terms of productivity 
and profitability [3]. Kroll [4], Ernst & Young (EY) [5], and 
KPMG [6] delivered their findings that massive frauds had 
been unmasked in the GCC by way of massive infrastructure 
investments involving sovereign wealth funds, government-
owned entities, and private sector businesses as the primary 
sources of capital. 
The Scandal in the Public Eye 
During 2007–2010, financial malfeasance in Dubai-based 
companies during the crisis-stage involved over USD1 billion, 
of which USD501 million was incurred at Dubai Islamic Bank 
(DIB) within one year [7]. This is one of the largest cases 
exposed to the public in 2008 and revealed the involvement of 
several white-collar individuals from different positions as well 
as nationalities. 
The case is not the first scandal to take place at DIB. In 
fact, between 1995 and 1998, the bank suffered financial losses 
due to embezzlement involving unauthorized transactions 
worth USD300 million [8]. The case unmasked three company 
employees who committed a breach of trust and illegally 
authorized transactions as well as twelve external individuals 
from different nationalities who together with the employees 
had defrauded DIB [9]. This embezzlement, which is called a 
“significant fraud”, had prompted the Government of Dubai to 
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increase its shareholding in DIB from 6% to a high level of 
30% [10].  
The UAE, in which Dubai is the central real estate in the 
GCC, has its idiosyncratic magnetism in investing activities, 
particularly from Islamic financial industries. Accordingly, this 
sumptuous attractiveness creates a huge supply-driven growth 
in human capital from the locals to the citizens of various 
countries who bring with them different cultures and faiths, not 
forgetting the large amount of funds to be invested and 
overturned. As might be expected, these investors, customers, 
and workforce have vast differences among them.  
Most people believe that the implementation of technology 
is an excellent mean to prevent the diverse characters of human 
beings from committing a multitude of frauds within an 
organization. Nevertheless, the banking institution is 
susceptible to potentially a variety of frauds [11] regardless of 
the major jurisdictional actions implemented. It is an irrefutable 
and inherent nature of a bank since this financial institution 
handles a huge amount of highly liquid capital, particularly in 
the form of cash. In addition, despite the fraudsters’ attempts to 
improve their modus operandi over time, they often tend to 
leave loopholes not exclusively for the institution but also for 
the relevant regulators to uncover the fraud. On this account, 
the paper endeavors to trace the chain of events to achieve an 
understanding of the mega financial crime that occurred at DIB 
and juxtapose it with other global frauds during the crisis as 
well as draw attention to the potential reasons, key responsible 
figures and others possible learnings from the scandal. 
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
A. Unethical Practices and Crisis: Silent or Invisible? 
History has shown that financial misconducts are complex 
while fraudulent activities are unnoticeable. For instance, a 
study highlighted that the likelihood of fraud to be concealed 
would be increased in a corporate culture that exercises 
secrecy, centralized control and excessive control, while the 
lack of transparency keeps hanging in the air [12]. It means that 
fraudsters who occupy a top-level position would be more 
likely to be able to conceal their unethical action for many 
years even from supervisory agencies, victims, and bystanders 
as compared to the common worker [13]. In another scenario 
surrounding the issue, secrecy is committed by witnesses who 
possess information of something unlawful, illegal, and 
unethical occurring within the bounds of the organization, yet 
take no initiative to tell the truth [13].  
The fraudulent activities go from bad to worse and will 
reach a point when fraudulent practices are claimed as a 
‘custom’ or acceptable practice and needless to say, it is 
derived from forced self-justification of certain groups or 
individuals to rationalize their multifarious frauds. KPMG 
reported that “there was an increase in the proportion of cases 
involving collusion in the EMA (Europe, Middle East, Africa) 
and Asia-Pacific regions” and additionally fraudulent action by 
dint of collaboration grow at the level of 32%, 61%, and 70% 
for the period of 2007, 2011, and 2013 respectively [14]. 
Surprisingly, the report also highlighted that incidences of 
collusion were higher in states in which business dealings are 
frequently motivated by social and family relationships. 
B. White-Collar Fraud  
1) Quintessential White-Collar Crime 
As published by KPMG in its global survey of 69 countries 
and 78 countries in 2011 and 2013, respectively [6, 14], major 
typical fraudsters possess similar characteristics: male, at the 
age of 36 to 45, commits against own employer, work in 
finance or finance-related task, assumes a senior management 
role, has been employed by the company for more than one 
decade, and co-commits with another fraudster (conspiracy). 
The 2011 survey also brought to public attention the case 
where senior management together with a board member 
remained as major players in fraudulent business dealings in 
the period between the surveys of 2007 and 2011.  
TABLE I.  LEVEL OF FRAUD PERPETRATOR WITHIN ORGANIZATION 
Level of Fraud Perpetrator within Organization 
 2007  2011 
Senior Management 
and Board Member 
60% 53% 
Management 26% 29% 
Staff 14% 18% 
Source: KPMG (2011) 
 
2) Potential Rationale for Fraud 
Looking back at the period in which the world suffered 
from a financial crisis, an EY Survey [5] revealed that the 
motivations for fraud in the Middle East were mostly due to the 
selfish desire for wealth (greediness), followed by an 
opportunity to maneuver and perhaps surprisingly, personal 
debt plays a part as well. Similarly, KPMG in its GCC Fraud 
survey [15] revealed the reasoning behind the fraudulent 
dealings in which the fraudsters were substantially driven by 
greed and hunger for a lifestyle of grandeur beside being 
presented by an opportune moment (opportunity).  
As a comparison, the following charts show the results of 
the survey by EY and KPMG explaining the rationale for 
committing multifarious financial white-collar crimes during 
the period of the financial crisis (the results are shown in 
percentage):  
Figure 1.  Rationales for Committing Frauds – EY Survey 
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Source: EY (2011), with rearrangement from the author 
 
 
Figure 2.  Rationales for Committing Frauds – KPMG Survey 
Source: KPMG (2011) 
KPMG [15] and EY [5] explained that from their financial 
forensic result, poor ethical culture and inappropriate ethics 
policy within corporations are proven to go well with the 
contributing motivations for committing fraud. In other words, 
developing and implementing robust ethical practices as well 
as professionalism within the bounds of the business institution 
are essentially needed to save the would-be fraudster or the 
challenger of infringement from an attempt on the unlawful act.  
On the practical manner of fraud motivations, Salin, 
Manan, and Kamaluddin [16] highlighted that the possible 
reasons for recurring frauds, corruptions and unethical 
practices in the firm's ecosystem could be due to the following 
(refer Table 2):  
TABLE II.  POSSIBLE REASONS FOR FRAUD, CORRUPTION, AND 
UNETHICAL PRACTICES 
Origin Concerns 
Directors with 
poor ethics 
Unethical and fraudulent activities such as fraud, 
bribery, and misappropriations practiced by 
directors are a contradiction to proficiency 
status, namely education or expertness. 
Deficient Board 
Model 
An absence of supervising function upon the 
potential unethical decision by the board. 
Weak 
Enforcement 
Unfair judgment between unethical actions that 
bring losses and financial penalty by court 
judgment. 
Political 
Governance 
There are both ineffectual and inefficient law-
making (legislation) and law-proceedings 
(litigation) whereby intervention of politicians 
into industries are more powerful than the 
enactment of rules and regulation. 
Failure of third-
party assurance 
provider 
The propensity of secondary service providers 
such as the auditor, corporate secretary (internal-
external), lawyer, and other professional 
advisors to transform into ‘gain keeper’ and 
contribute to corporate scandal. 
Helpless 
secondary 
lifeline 
Ignorance and passiveness of management over 
warning signs or critical questions delivered by 
analysts and researchers. 
Source: Salin, Manan and Kamaluddin (2017) 
 
3) Insider vs. Outsider 
A number of studies mapped out that the fraudsters’ 
background in the environment of Islamic banking could be 
from either internal or external parties [17, 18]. Outsider 
fraudsters could be customers, suppliers, contractors, asset 
appraisers and lawyers. According to KPMG Survey 2013, the 
fraudsters often conduct their fraudulent activities in 
collaboration with others instead of going solo [14]. In detail, 
the comparison between the two are 70% for the perpetrator 
being accompanied and the unaccompanied take the remnant of 
30%. 
III. METHODOLOGY 
The development of the conceptual framework leads to the 
utilization of the descriptive analysis for the study. Next, the 
paper would narrow down its analysis on Dubai Islamic Bank 
Public Joint Stock Company’s (PJSC) scandal during the 
period of the financial crisis between 2007 and 2011. In terms 
of data collection, the author gathered data from varied 
sources. The most important data of the study is the secondary 
data, as access to primary data for this study is limited, which 
is unsurprising because DIB and most commercial institutions, 
regardless of locality, would abstain from officially publishing 
information related to financial crimes perpetrated within the 
institution. On that account, in respect of fraud in a general 
scope, the author mainly took reference from independent 
financial forensic reports issued by globally established 
financial service providers, namely EY, KPMG, and Kroll, 
besides academic journals. Guided by the objective of the 
paper, viz. the scandal, data were obtained from news reports, 
articles and legal articles that have interest in the case. 
Using the information obtained from the various sources, 
the author attempted to reconstruct the DIB case so that the 
paper could deduce the major issues pertinent to factors of 
fraudulent activities, inter alia, potential reasons, key 
responsible figures, modus operandi and the possible after-
effect of the fraud including legal proceedings. 
IV. FINDING AND DISCUSSION 
A. The Scandal Unveiled in the Islamic Bank  
1) Typical Fraudster  
The DIB financial scandal that is one of the largest frauds 
and had taken place in Dubai was first heard in the Dubai Court 
of First Instance in 2008 [19]. The case revealed six white-
collar perpetrators of the crime: two Pakistani men who held 
senior executive positions in DIB (a 39-year-old finance 
manager together with his 50-year-old deputy), two British 
businessmen (a 48-year-old and a 50-year-old), a 36-year-old 
Turk businessman and an American businessman (the financial 
manager’s sibling) [20].  
Briefly, in 2011, the perpetrators came to light for 
defrauding, conspiring, and collaborating in the scandal when 
the highest court of Dubai sentenced the six defendants for ten 
years and imposed a fine of USD501 million (it is the 
collective fine for the two former DIB officials, two Britons, 
and one Turk) and USD 2 million (it is the collective fine for 
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the kith and kin: the American citizen and the former financial 
manager) as compensation for the loss suffered by DIB [20]. 
The following subsection will discuss the substantial point of 
the case. 
2) Time Journey of the Scandal 
It is undeniable that the oil sector was a luxury investment. 
Even DIB declared that the rise in oil price and demand was in 
line with the remarkable financial achievement of DIB during 
the financial year 2004. In the same year, DIB, in which the 
Government of Dubai was the major shareholder, entered into 
an investment agreement with a company owned by three of 
the outsider defendants (a Turkish private bank called CCH) 
for project financing in the oil sector involving the acquisition 
of a Canadian oil refinery and then shipping it to Pakistan. As a 
consequence of this project, CCH was in debt to DIB for an 
amount of USD170 million [20].  
As alleged by the CEO of DIB in the courtroom, CCH had 
breached the contract whereby CCH had embezzled USD18 
million into another project without DIB’s consent [21]. Thus, 
in 2007, a Restructuring Agreement was prepared since CCH 
had defaulted on the facility. However, when they issued the 
‘excellence recommendation’, the two former executives of 
DIB had neglected the bank’s credit limit policy, and they 
subsequently granted more financing up to USD501 million to 
CCH after receiving illicit payment and bogus documents 
provided by the outsider fraudsters [20].  
On the surface, as a consequence of the Agreement, the 
bank required a security to be provided so that more financing 
could be extended to CCH, but for the USD18 million 
embezzlement, the bank gave the fraudsters 15 days to remedy 
the situation. The security in the case is a holding company, 
Plantation Holdings. It is a company owned by a friend of the 
outsiders, who was charged in the court with aiding and 
abetting on the restructuring process by providing Plantation as 
security [22]. Moreover, the reason that the security was 
included in the restructuring was mostly that it directly 
benefited from the money [23]. The security itself is a holding 
company called Plantation Holdings valued at USD3.5 billion 
[24]. Due to the high security value, DIB had abstained from 
taking legal action at that time [25].  
Apart from the three fraudsters mentioned above, the 
remaining offender, i.e. the American, had defrauded the bank 
of USD2 million by collaborating with the former financial 
manager. The American was a close associate of the three 
fraudsters, and the modus operandi employed was by supplying 
and approving forged documents. 
In summary, the conspiracy and collaboration among the 
fraudsters that had essentially brought them into conflicts with 
the law involved the following:  
i) Granting and accepting bribery (kickbacks); 
ii) Providing and approving bogus financing documents 
(forgery); 
iii) Unlawful profiteering; 
iv) Ignoring regulation on credit limit allowance; 
v) Conspiring to embezzle public funds; 
vi) Deliberately causing losses for Dubai Islamic Bank, 
the government and its entities. 
The last point is the most significant accusation by the 
persecutors in the court. DIB that is one of the most long-
standing Islamic banks in the world was established more than 
three decades ago and as of December 2009 was controlled by 
Dubai Government through 30% shareholding ownership. 
Moreover, DIB held 4% stake in the Federal Government 
Pension Fund. As mentioned earlier, Dubai is a property hub in 
the GCC countries. Unquestionable, DIB, which supported 
assets-backed financing (direct equity), took the lead in 
Dubai’s real estate market. As of 10 December 2009 however, 
the financial position of DIB was reduced to a low level and 
was claimed as degenerating as an implication of the financial 
crime within the bank, which subsequently led to material 
default and negative climate in the property market as well as 
economic volatility in the Gulf. Moody’s Analytics stated that 
“Among UAE-based Islamic financial institutions, DIB is in 
addition one of the most heavily exposed banks to both 
Nakheel and Dubai World” [26]. 
3) Collaborators - Insiders and Outsiders 
Probing the case further, it becomes clear that the 
fraudulent actions were conducted by more than one 
perpetrator. In other words, it involved deliberate collaboration 
or financial conspiracy involving both insiders and outsiders. 
The actions of the group of collaborators could be segregated 
in three directions: insider-to-insider, outsider-to-outsider, and 
insider-to-outsider. 
B. The Other Side of the Coin 
1) Weak Enforcement of Corporate Governance 
Disclosure 
The case has substantiated that Islamic banking institutions 
are no longer immune to financial crimes which come with a 
labyrinthine modus operandi. Many studies have shown to the 
public especially during the global crisis that one of the major 
contributing factors to crimes is poor quality of governance 
[27] whereby there is limited access to information with regard 
to whether there is excessive control in the organization and 
how the organization’s internal control is functioning. In the 
case of DIB, it is apparent that high-level officials of DIB such 
as the board of directors turned a blind eye to the above issues 
and chose to avoid from further public scrutiny. Ironically, this 
phenomenon exhibited that each of DIB’s stakeholder had 
confidence in DIB such that no question was raised even 
though DIB had published its official governance reports only 
for 2011 and 2012. It is to be noted that the enactment of the 
code of corporate governance in the UAE by the UAE’s 
Securities and Commodities Authority (SCA) took place in 
early 2007. Subsequently, in October 2009, the code was 
amended by the UAE Ministry of Economy and takes effect 
starting 30 April 2010 to make Corporate Government 
disclosure an obligation for listed companies [28].  
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2) Poor Judgment of Risk Management 
“The recent banking crisis created by the decisions of major 
international banks to abandon risk management in favor of 
huge but illusory gains” [29]. Thus, the risk management 
function is vital for all companies all over the world. As a 
matter of fact, the risk management structure of DIB evidently 
provides clear-cut roles and responsibilities of the various 
elements where one of the elements is the internal audit 
function [30]. Yet these components failed to take charge 
‘shoulder to shoulder’ of the internal affairs namely detecting, 
identifying, controlling, and approving the operations regarding 
the restructuring of the financing facilities worth USD501 
million to the outsider firm. The Risk Management Department 
and the Internal Audit Department which superintended 
schemes of credit approval had failed to catch the breaches. 
Surprisingly, however, the departments were unassailable even 
when giving information in the courtroom [31, 20].  
TABLE III.  RISK MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE OF DIB IN 2007 
Risk Management Structure of DIB 
 Responsible For: 
BOD Overall risk management approach. 
Approving the risk strategies and principles. 
Risk 
Management 
Committee 
Developing risk strategy, implementing principles, 
frameworks, policies, and limits.  
Responsible for the fundamental risk issues and 
manages and monitors relevant risk decisions. 
Risk 
Management 
and Control 
Implementing and maintaining risk-related 
procedures for credit approval, credit 
administration, portfolio management, market risk 
and overall risk control. 
Treasury Managing the Group’s assets and liabilities and the 
overall financial structure.  
Managing funding and liquidity risks of the Group. 
Internal Audit Auditing risk management processes periodically 
(examines both the adequacy of and compliance 
with the procedures).  
Discussing the results of all assessments with 
management and reporting findings and 
recommendations to the Audit Committee. 
Source: DIB Annual Report 2007 
 
3) Overdependence on the Security Pledged 
It should be borne in mind that Islamic financial institutions 
(IFIs) should have an awareness of the root of the sub-prime 
mortgage crisis whereby it initially originated from ‘poor credit 
background’ borrowers. The chief reasoning the lenders 
arranged the loans for the borrowers was primarily motivated 
by the securities provided by the borrowers. It is undeniable 
fact that the potential risk of financing/loan non-performance 
either in IFIs or the conventional counterpart could be 
mitigated by obtaining security from the customers. As 
indicated in the previous section, the substantial fund of 
USD501 million as a result of the restructuring should not have 
been transferred to the outsider fraudster [32]. While the 
internal fraudsters had succeeded in approving the bogus 
document, which means the fraudsters had a centralized 
authority, another aspect that contributed to the scandal was 
overdependence upon the security pledged. 
C. Legal Action 
1) Suing the Security for Breach of Contract in the 
Jurisdiction of the English Court 
In July 2008, legal action was initiated by DIB against 
Plantation Holdings (Plantation) after Plantation dismissed 
DIB’s notice demanding the company to rectify certain 
breaches of contract and non-compliance against Dubai law 
within a month [33]. Consequently, DIB commenced 
foreclosure against the company through litigation mechanism. 
The contract between DIB and Plantation stipulated the 
choice of venue for both parties in the event of unsettled issues, 
namely the English High Court. In 2013, the bank embarked on 
legal enforcement against Plantation before the court, in which 
case, the bank obtained a court judgment of USD432 million 
against the defendant.  
This was followed by the appeal procedure. It was different 
from the earlier case, whereby in 2016–2017, DIB became the 
defendant since Plantation had made a claim against the bank.  
In brief, in April 2017, Baker & Mckenzie, a London-based 
law firm that acted on behalf of Dubai Islamic Bank Public 
Joint Stock Company gained a successful outcome after 
winning against Plantation’s legal representative, David Wyld 
& Co in an eight-week trial in the English Commercial Court 
[22]. Despite Plantation’s attempt to defend itself in the case 
involving USD2 billion, the plaintiff failed to prove that DIB 
had breached the Restructuring Agreement in 2007 and as a 
consequence, lost its claim [22]. It was an unexpected finding 
that the judge of the court prevailed that “Plantation's principal 
director had "made up" evidence and that another of 
Plantation's witnesses had "manufactured" documents” [22]. 
Lastly, other significance verdicts of the court are that 
Plantation was ordered to pay 70% of the Bank's costs on an 
indemnity basis and most importantly, Plantation was refused 
further appeal, which means the case was closed [22]. 
2) Issue on Choice of Law 
One of the British defendants who was based in Bahrain 
and had already lived in the Middle East for more than two 
decades, in his defence, claimed that his actions adhered to the 
Islamic principle [34]. Regardless of the justification or the 
system of the law enforced by the Dubai Government, which is 
not the main purpose of the study, it is obvious that both the 
bank as the financier and the defendant as the customer had an 
unsettled contract and might have misinformation regarding the 
venue and the law that would be enforced when disputes 
materialize. With regard to the issue of the choice of law as 
well as the choice of forum in terms of cross-border 
transactions, it is vital to avoid uncertainty on the jurisdiction 
of hearing the case that is whether or not it falls under the 
purview of the shari’ah law [35]. 
V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
A. Conclusion 
The The scandal divulged that Islamic banking, with its 
significant growth in both credit and asset, could attract people 
to create unusual fraudulent transactions. Unsurprisingly, the 
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power of the government as evidenced through its majority 
shareholding and mandating faith-based banking does not seem 
to deter the executive-level collaborators, causing outrage 
among many civilized lawmakers. It shows that similar to its 
conventional counterpart, Islamic banking is not immune to 
white-collar crimes. The achievement of astonishing growth in 
Islamic banking assets does not seem to be matched by the 
capability to manage those assets. Provided that Islamic banks 
are prepared to move forward as a dynamic institution, there is 
a big chance that the industry will succeed in the long run. By 
an analogy, the Islamic bank is similar to a vehicle whereby the 
bigger the vehicle, the harder it would be to steer. 
Notwithstanding the road taken in the day-to-day activities is 
almost interchangeable, the individuals are changeable. As has 
been demonstrated, the damage is not ‘a scratch’ that 
endangers the bank directly and could be recovered in an 
instant, but it evidently results in a stressful situation not only 
for the bank as the ultimate victim but could also bring legal 
consequences, financial expense as well as bad impression to 
other parties either directly or indirectly through their links to 
the bank. Therefore, Islamic banks and other financial 
institutions elsewhere are challenged to not only have a well-
built structure as well as sound judgment at every stage to 
ensure that both major stakeholders and other wide-ranging 
stakeholders are protected against the perpetrators, but should 
also have virtuous higher-level human-resource personnel as 
role models. Thus, sustainable, robust and prudent Islamic code 
of ethics are essential instruments in Islamic financial 
institutions, and this paper aims to restore the awareness of the 
need to comply with what is right or wrong from shari’ah 
perspective as well as the jurisdiction in which the industry is 
obligated to comply with certain policies and civilized laws. As 
the nature of fraud is ever changing and evolving, further 
studies should be done to achieve a dynamic, effective, refined 
and sustainable Islamic banking sector in particular and Islamic 
finance industry in general. 
B. Recommendation  
 Promoting as well as Manifesting the Commitment to 
Disclosure  
Rules and regulation concerning KYC (Know Your 
Customer) have been a longstanding feature in the banking 
ecosystem. Even so, there is one counterpart element that 
typically escapes notice, i.e. the absence of ‘Know Your 
Agent’. It should be borne in mind that the ‘agent’, which this 
paper aims to highlight, is the first to enforce early prevention, 
detection, and scrutiny over frauds within an organization. 
Second, there must be a certain degree of openness on the part 
of the agent concerning roles and responsibilities in running the 
business. It means breaking the silence to bring fairness, 
transparency and accountability to the organization.  
Demand for accessible information such as corporate 
governance disclosure together with a feasible whistleblowing 
system that give protection and incentive are pivotal in 
boosting good agency relationship and responsibility of top-
level stakeholders, namely shareholders, chairman, board 
members and its committees (audit and remuneration), shari’ah 
supervisory board, senior management and chief executive 
upon other stakeholders such as customers, regulators, 
employees and the public. Broadly speaking, oration without 
clear, pragmatic direction is blandishment of work thus the 
government as the supreme regulator in the state should 
manifest conclusively its commitment note solely to ensure 
robust disclosure, but also to declare consistently that bribe and 
such is illegal and must not be claimed as the “cost of 
business”. 
 Flourishing Beyond Shari’ah as a Resilient Identity 
As an inherent nature of the financial institution, the 
Islamic bank ought to accentuate the pro-active instead of the 
reactive approach. Notwithstanding the bank places emphasis 
on recovery of the financing facility, the scandal has put the 
bank in the limelight such that the damages might give rise to 
new risks such as distrust of both customers and the public 
upon the bank particularly, and the Islamic finance industry in 
general. 
While the ‘form and substance’ of a contract of products or 
services have been accomplished, the objectives of the Islamic 
law, i.e. maqasid al-shari’ah should be attuned to. Maqasid al-
ahkam al-shari’ah or commonly linked to public welfare 
(maslahah) within the Muslim societies emphasizes that the 
shari’ah ruling must protect five dimensions: faith, life, 
intellect, prosperity, and property. As an illustration, 
conducting partnership in lawful aqad and demanding 
collateral as a solution are permissible and convenient, 
however, conspiring by accepting illicit payment, committing 
forgery, breaching employer’s trust, neglecting well-judged co-
performance, and channeling fund at the expense of the nation 
including money-laundering, terrorism, and other devious acts 
as well as being untrustworthy would be inconsistent to the 
intention of the Lawgiver. A Muslim need not wait for the 
Judgment Day to know what is right and wrong, as the results 
could be instant. For instance, the contracts could be lawfully 
nullified, bring legal consequences, cause a bad impression to 
the public, and in more serious situations it might be 
discovered as in the case of the sub-prime meltdown. 
 Investing in Islamic Teaching as an Ethical Culture 
Several social ills nowadays namely unlawful deeds 
including bribery, corruption and fraud occur because the 
public at large bestow dominantly on physical joyful rather 
than promoting human development such as spiritual 
necessities (versus hedonism) [36]. Therefore, it is crucial that 
Islamic teaching should be dedicated at the entire activities of 
human beings so that it could instill ethical and good practices 
starting from home to the workplace and embed in the heart 
until it is put into actual practice. As a consequence, Islamic 
ethics in the person would grow as a powerful shield that is 
continuously adaptable to technology, the rapid growth of the 
economy and humans’ endless desires. In this respect, Human 
Resource and Development is the department that should take 
this constructive duty to create a pool of high standard 
workforce because it is responsible for providing an end-to-end 
mechanism (screening, recruiting, maintaining, training, 
upgrading, firing) of the company’s human resource. 
Moreover, it is advisable that the company keeps itself up-to-
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date with global issues and upgrades the expertise of the 
workforce by means of bridging relationships with external 
institutions such as professional accountants to promote a high 
standard of ethics coupled with a professional workforce. In 
addition, a set of feasible and pragmatic ethics policy plus 
regulation are indispensable as an ‘early warning system’ and 
to pre-empt loss of money, bankruptcy, sanction by the 
regulator, public scrutiny, and an abominable event such as a 
crisis. 
 Certainty of Legal Resolution and Demand for 
Globalized Standard 
From a legal perspective, it is clear that the government 
should contribute by assisting stakeholders in terms of 
legislation and litigation. While conducting cross-border 
business activities, however, it is important for any Islamic 
organization to be in compliance with all related laws: local, 
international, as well as shari’ah. There might be added 
complexities when a country implements a dual financial 
system, but on the other side, the perpetrator lives in a 
jurisdiction that adopts a single system. For that reason, it is 
important for the parties to make it explicit in the clause in the 
contract regarding the forum and the law that will be used 
when they wish to settle a dispute. Also, the study suggests that 
there is an urgency for Islamic banking and finance institutions 
globally to have a globalized Shariah standard either for 
litigation or non-litigation matters that is in line with the spirit 
of Islam to enhance public as well as customer confidence in 
the industry. 
 Bursting Interdependence of Interfaith Communities 
By means of commercial transactions (Muamalat), Shari’ah 
as evidenced by the Qur’an, Sunnah, and other sources of 
Islamic law gives lawful permission to make contracts with any 
eligible party. Precisely, it nurtures long-term socio-economic 
goals, not exclusive to the Muslim society but includes the 
non-Muslim community as well.  
Abrahamic faiths, i.e. Islam, Christian, and Judaism have 
commonality in their holy scriptures concerning business ethics 
namely rejection of bribery, cheating, fraud, discrimination, 
and unfair compensation [37]. In depth, the aforesaid study 
came with a foregone conclusion that majority of religion and 
faith in the world have commonality in ethics issue. It refers to 
two declarations towards interfaith commitment of Global 
ethic. An Interfaith Declaration: A Code of Ethics on 
International Business for Christians, Muslims and Jews (1993) 
and Declaration Toward a Global Ethic (Parliament of the 
World’s Religions 1993) signed by Hinduism, Buddhism, 
Sikhism, Baha’i, Jainism, Shintoism, and others at the 
Parliament of the World’s Religions in 1993 [37]. This is to say 
that practical discussions upon business ethics between the 
broader interfaith communities is practicable and acceptable. 
Therefore, open interfaith discussions are essential to instil 
responsiveness over ethical standards among all Muslims, 
Christians, and Jews all over the world. 
 
REFERENCES 
[1] D. O’Neill, United Arab Emirates: Dubai Islamic Bank puts the past 
behind it. Euro Money, 2013, Retrieved 
from https://www.euromoney.com/article/b12kjvffjf5j75/united-arab-
emirates-dubai-islamic-bank-puts-the-past-behind-it?copyrightInfo=true 
[2] M. Hasan and J. Dridi, The effects of the global crisis on Islamic and 
conventional banks: a comparative study, IMF Working Paper 2010. 
[3] H. Miniaoui and G. Gohou. Did Islamic banking perform better during 
the financial crisis? evidence from the UAE, 2013. 
[4] Kroll, Kroll global fraud report, 2010. 
[5] EY, Bribery, corruption, and fraud in the Middle East: first Middle 
East bribery, corruption and fraud survey, 2011. 
[6] KPMG, Who is the typical fraudster: KPMG analysis of global patterns 
of fraud, 2011. 
[7] L. M. Odeh, State of global financial crime in-depth analysis on GCC 
countries, 2015. 
[8] W. Rajhi and S. A. Hassairi, Unconventional banking system in distress, 
2011. 
[9] Gulf News, Jail sentences dropped in Islamic bank, 2001, Retrieved 
from  http://gulfnews.com/news/uae/general/jail-sentences-dropped-in-
islamic-bank-embezzlement-case-1.422297 
[10] Dubai Financial Service Authority, Dubai Islamic Bank PJSC prospectus 
2017, 2017, Retrieved from 
http://www.dfsa.ae/CMSPages/GetFile.aspx?guid=7d44cdd4-4961-
4530-a5bf-353f8e9ada0b 
[11] Z. M. Sanusi, M. N. F. Rameli, and Y. M. Isa, Fraud schemes in the 
banking institutions: prevention measures to avoid severe financial loss, 
2015, Presented at the 7th International Conference on Financial 
Criminology 2015, 13–14 April 2015, Wadham College, Oxford, United 
Kingdom.  
[12] A. R. Morgan and C. Burnside, Olympus Corporation financial 
statement fraud case study: the role that national culture plays on 
detecting and deterring fraud, 2014. 
[13] H. V. D. Bunt, Wall of secrecy and silence: the Madoff case and cartels 
in the construction industry, in The global economy, economic crisis, 
and white-collar crime, 2010, p.435–453. 
[14] KPMG, Global profiles of fraudster: white-collar crime – present and 
future, 2013. 
[15] KPMG, GCC fraud survey for gulf cooperation council (GCC) 
countries, 2008. Retrieved from 
http://www.middleeasttransparent.com/IMG/pdf/2008_GCC_Fraud_Sur
vey_English_1_.pdf 
[16] A. S. A. P. Salin, S. K. Ab Manan, N. Kamaluddin, The role of Islamic 
ethics to prevent corporate fraud, 2017. 
[17] Z. M. Sanusi, M. N. F. Rameli, and Y. M. Isa, Fraud schemes in the 
banking institutions: prevention measures to avoid severe financial loss. 
7th International conference on financial criminology 2015 13-14 April 
2015, Wadham College, Oxford, United Kingdom. 
[18] R. A. Rahman and I. S. K. Anwar, Effectiveness of fraud prevention and 
detection techniques in Malaysian Islamic banks, 2014. 
[19] A. Shaaban, Dubai Islamic Bank Fraud Case Adjourned, Khaleej Times, 
2009, Retrieved from    
https://www.khaleejtimes.com/article/20090428/ARTICLE/304289911/
1002 
[20] A. Mustafa, Dubai Islamic Bank fraud repayment ordered back to 
appeals court, The National, 2011, Retrieved 
from https://www.thenational.ae/uae/courts/dubai-islamic-bank-fraud-
repayment-ordered-back-to-appeals-court-1.375115 
[21] A. Mustafa, Bank investment chief testifies in fraud trial, The National, 
2009. 
[22] Baker Mckenzie, Dubai Islamic Bank wins major litigation case,  
Retrieved from http://www.bakermckenzie.com/en/newsroom/2017/04. 
[23] R. Spencer, British businessmen in Dubai sentenced to 10 years for 
fraud, The Telegraph, 2011, Retrieved from 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/dubai/8478123/
British-businessmen-in-Dubai-sentenced-to-10-years-for-fraud.html 
EJIF – European Journal of Islamic Finance  No11, December (2018) 
http://www.ojs.unito.it/index.php/EJIF ISSN 2421-2172 8 
[24] S. Fenton, DIB takes over $3.5b Plantation Holding, The Gulf News, 
2008, Retrieved from http://gulfnews.com/business/property/dib-takes-
over-3-5b-plantation-holding-1.141720 
[25] R. Spencer, End of a glittering Dubai dream: three britons in jail accused 
of $500 million 'fraud', The Telegraph, 2009, Retrieved 
from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/dubai/558
8310/End-of-a-glittering-Dubai-dream-three-Britons-in-jail-accused-of-
500-million-fraud.html 
[26] A. Hassoune, Moody’s DIB Analysis February 2010, Moody’s Investors 
Service. 2010, Retrieved from http://media.corporate-
ir.net/media_files/irol/19/199381/MoodysDIBAnalysis-Feb2010.pdf  
[27] S. Srairi, Corporate governance disclosure practices and performance of 
islamic banks in GCC countries, Journal of Islamic Finance, Vol. 4 No. 
2 (2015) 001 – 017, IIUM Institute of Islamic Banking and 
Finance ISSN 2289-2117 (O) / 2289-2109. 
[28] A. M. J. Qasim, The impact of corporate governance on firm 
performance: evidence from the UAE. European Journal of Business and 
Management. ISSN 2222-1905 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2839 
(Online) Vol.6, No.22, 2014. 
[29] J. Simpson and J. Taylor, Corporate Governance, Ethics and CSR. New 
Delhi: London Philadelphia. p28. 
[30] Dubai Islamic Bank, Dubai Islamic Bank (Public Joint Stock Company) 
and subsidiaries consolidated financial statements: 31 December 2007, 
2007. 
[31] B. Za’za’, Lawyer accuses Dubai Islamic Bank official of concealing 
fraud: officials allegedly conspired in cover-up leading to huge loss, 
Gulf News, 2010, Retrieved 
from http://gulfnews.com/news/uae/crime/lawyer-accuses-dubai-
islamic-bank-official-of-concealing-fraud-1.608470. 
[32]  A. Mustafa, Dubai Islamic Bank chief tells court how men 'stole' 
Dh1.8bn”, The National, 2011. 
[33] i-Law, Plantation holdings (FZ) LLC V Dubai Islamic Bank PJSC, 2017, 
Retrieved from https://www.i-law.com/ilaw/doc/view.htm?id=375790 
[34] Shariah Finance Watch, British Businessman Fights Dubai Bank Fraud 
Claim, 2010, Retrieved from 
http://www.shariahfinancewatch.org/blog/2010/04/08/british-
businessman-fights-dubai-bank-fraud-claim/ 
[35] A. Hasan and M. H. Ahmed, The application of choice of law and choice 
of forum clauses to islamic banking and financial cross border 
transaction, Australian Journal of Basic and Applied Science, 6(11):370-
380, 2012. 
[36] H. Hamzah, Human development and hedonism culture challenges: a 
review from Islamic perspective, 2016. 
[37] M. Quddus, H. Bailey, and L. R. White, Business ethics: perspectives 
from Judaic, Christian, and Islamic scriptures, 2009. 
EJIF – European Journal of Islamic Finance Editorial Team 
Editor in Chief 
Prof. Paolo Pietro Biancone, University of Turin, Italy 
Editorial Board 
Prof. Dian Masyita, University of Padjadjaran, Indonesia 
Prof. Abdulazeem Abozaid, Qatar Faculty of Islamic Studies – Qatar 
Prof. Ahmad Aref Almazari, King Saud University, Saudi Arabia 
Prof. Nidal A. Alsayyed, Inayah Islamic Finance Research Institute, USA 
Prof. Roberta Aluffi, University of Turin - Italy 
Prof. Ghassen Bouslama, NEOMA Business School - Campus de Reims, France 
Prof. Nazam Dzolkarnaini, Salford University, UK 
Prof. Kabir Hassan, University of New Orleans, USA 
Prof. Khaled Hussainey, University of Plymouth, UK 
Prof. Rifki Ismal, University of Indonesia 
Prof. Tariqullah Khan, Hamad bin Khalifa University, Qatar 
Prof. Ali Khorshid, ICMA Centre Reading University - UK 
Prof. Amir Kia, Utah Valley University, USA 
Prof. Laurent Marliere, Université Paris-Dauphine France 
Prof. Federica Miglietta, University of Bari - Italy 
Prof. Hakim Ben Othman, University of Tunis - Tunisia 
Prof. Mohamed Ramady, King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals, Saudi Arabia 
Prof. Mamunur Rashid, Nottingham University, Malaysia 
Prof. Younes Soualhi, International Islamic University Malaysia 
Prof. Laurent Weill, University of Strasbourg, France 
